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The following Statement of Facts is submitted in support 
of respondent's position and in opposition to any contradic-
tory portions of the appellant's Statement of Facts. 
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In its Findings of Fact (R. 285, et seq.), which are 
uncontroverted by the appellant, the trial court concluded 
that the evidence presented showed that the defendant Jensen 
Brothers Construction Company ("JBC") entered into a real 
estate listing agreement with the plaintiff Taylor, National, 
Inc., ("Taylor National") whereby Taylor National agreed to 
act as an agent for JBC in procuring the sale of a residence 
located in Orem, Utah (R. 287, Finding of Fact No. 3). 
Taylor National thereafter did, in fact, make substantial 
efforts to sell the house (Id.); however, when Paul Taylor, 
as agent of the plaintiff, was informed by JBC that third 
party plaintiff Leon Harward was interested in purchasing 
the home, Taylor National did not contact Harward nor was 
any attempt made to negotiate with him incident to the sale. 
R. 287, Finding of Fact No. 4. 
Harward, a licensed real estate salesman, was informed 
by JBC several weeks prior to the closing date that Taylor 
National was the listing realtor (R. 287, Finding of Fact 
No. 5). Nevertheless, Harward failed to contact Taylor 
National either to present an offer for purchase of the home 
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through that company for Harward's own account or to nego-
tiate a commission split with the plaintiff for his employer, 
Continental Value Realty, at any time prior to the final 
closing of the purchase in December of 1977. Id. 
In mid-October of 1977, Leon Harward informed JBC that 
Taylor National, the listing realtor, had not contacted him 
and that unless an Earnest Money Agreement was entered into 
between Harward and JBC without further delay, Harward would 
attempt to negotiate a home purchase elsewhere. Based upon 
these representations by Harward, JBC entered into an Earnest 
Money Agreement for sale of the house. R. 288, Finding of 
Fact No. 6. 
Taylor National was informed of the Earnest Money Agree-
ment soon after it was signed on October 19, 1977. However, 
neither the plaintiff as listing realtor nor third party defen-
dant Leon Harward as real estate salesman for Value Realty 
made any attempt to communicate with each other concerning 
final purchase arrangements, closing of the transaction, nego-
tiation of a real estate commission split between listing 
realtor and selling realtor or arrangements for payment of a 
real estate commission to plaintiff prior to the date of 
closing, December 9, 1977. R. 288, Finding of Fact No. 8. 
The sale closed on December 9, 1977, at which time a 
six percent real estate commission was deducted by the clos-
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ing agent from proceeds of the sale, which were otherwise 
payable to the seller, JBC. The amount of the commission, 
$8,400, was identical to the amount ostensibly given by Leon 
Harward as purchaser to his employer, Continental Value 
Realty, as earnest money pursuant to the terms of the Earnest 
Money Agreement. The $8,400 earnest money was never depo-
sited with the closing agent, but instead was retained by 
Harward as agent for third party defendants Harrison and 
Soule, dba Continental Value Realty, as the total sales 
commission. R. 288-89, Finding of Fact No. 10. 
The trial court found that JBC had paid the six percent 
real estate commission in good faith at the time of closing, 
believing it had fulfilled its obligation in accordance with 
the Earnest Money Agreement. R. 289, Finding of Fact No. 11. 
As to the actions of the plaintiff Taylor National in 
failing to contact Harward, the buyer, the trial court 
concluded: 
9. Plaintiff as listing realtor to JBC 
and its fiduciary failed to take reasonable and 
necessary measures to protect its real estate 
commission as against third party defendant Leon 
Harward and Continental Value Realty. 
* * * 
12. Plaintiff in failing to exercise its 
responsibilities as fiduciary to defendant JBC 
in equity and good conscience has waived and is 
otherwise estopped from recovery of a second 
real estate commission against defendant JBC or 
from recovery of an attorney's fee against JBC 
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incident to collection of any sales commission 
owing to plaintiff, except as may be recovered 
through JBC from third party defendants Harward, 
Harrison and Soule. 
R. 288, 289, Findings of Fact Nos. 9 and 12. 
In light of these facts the court found that: 
16. Plaintiff Taylor National, Inc., is 
entitled to judgment against defendant JBC for 
the sum of $8,400.00 plus 6% interest from and 
after December 9, 1977, except that it is inequit-
able for plaintiff to execute against JBC or other-
wise take liens or encumber JBC assets as a result 
of any judgment in favor of plaintiff for sales 
commission on the Barrington House. 
R. 290, Finding of Fact No. 16. The court further determined 
that JBC was entitled to judgment against third-party defen-
dants Harward, Harrison and Soule for $8,400.00 "for conver-
sion of the $8,400.00 real estate commission retained by said 
third-party defendants.n R. 294, Findings of Fact No. 19(i). 
The trial court's findings thus show a rather complex 
factual situation not readily reconcilable through a standard 
form of judgment. Taylor National is entitled to a commis-
sion on the sale of JBC's house to Harward. Yet JBC has 
already paid the commission in good faith into the closing 
escrow in reliance on Harward's assurances that he will take 
care of JBC's obligation to Taylor National and on the fact 
that JBC has notified Taylor National of the sale, the buyer-
realtors identity, and the date of closing with a request 
that Taylor National work with the buyer as its fiduciary 
-4-
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obligation. Nevertheless, Taylor National fails in its obli-
gation to JBC by not making adequate efforts to contact Har-
ward and protect its commission, and Harward converts the 
already paid commission money, which he held in trust and 
was not entitled to, to his own use. 
The fact that Taylor National had failed to join Harward 
as a defendant was a further complication because the court 
was thus powerless to give direct relief as between those 
parties. 
The trial court nevertheless arrived at a simple and 
equitable solution to the problem in its judgment, awarding 
Taylor National the $8,400.00 which it was due as commission 
with the equitable limitations that execution not issue 
against JBC and that the judgment not constitute a lien 
on JBC property, but permitting Taylor National to pursue 
JBC's third-party judgment in the same amount against Harwood, 
Soule and Harrison. R. 299-300, paragraph 1. 
This judgment by the trial court is a creative and just 
resolution of the controversy before it, which puts the risk 
of an uncollectible judgment and the costs of collection on 
the plaintiff whose failure of fiduciary duty caused the con-
troversy, and not on the defendant who, acting in good faith, 
had already paid its obligation once. 
The trial court's judgment is wholly justifiable under 
the facts and applicable law. Nevertheless, should this Court 
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find invalid the provisos that execution not issue nor the 
judgment consistute a lien on JBC property, then the judgment 
as to JBC should be reversed or, in the alternative, vacated 
and remanded for further proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT HAS EQUITABLE POWER TO FASHION 
APPROPRIATE REMEDIES WHERE THERE HAS BEEN 
A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY. 
In Reese v. Harper, 329 P. 2d 410 (Utah, 1958), the 
Utah Supreme Court noted that the privilege of acting as 
a real estate broker and the inherent nature of the service 
performed gives rise to special responsibilities: 
Accordingly, persons who entrust their busi-
ness to such agents are entitled to repose some 
degree of confidence that they will be loyal to 
such trust and that they will, with reasonable 
diligence and in good faith, represent the inter-
ests of their clients. 
* * * 
Because of the specialized service the real 
estate broker offers in acting as an agent for 
his client, there arises a fiduciary relationship 
between them; it is incumbent upon him to apply 
his abilities and knowledge to the advantage of 
the man he serves; and to make full disclosure 
of all facts which his principal should know in 
transacting the business. Failure to discharge 
such duty with reasonable diligence and care pre-
cludes his recovery for the service he proports 
to be rendering. (Footnotes omitted.) 
Id., at 412. 
In the instant case, the trial Court concluded that JBC 
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the sale of the house and should not have to pay a second 
commission to Taylor National because of its breach of duty. 
The court further concluded that although Taylor National 
was in breach of its fiduciary duty owed to JBC, that, vis-
a-vis third party defendants Value Realty and Leon Har-
ward Taylor National should have the commission and third 
party defendants were not entitled to it. Since the court 
could not award a direct verdict in favor of Taylor 
National against Harward and Value Realty, it chose to do 
equity by allowing Taylor National to execute on JBC's award 
and to protect JBC by forbidding execution against it. 
Taylor National argues that, in effect, once the Court 
has found that the commission is due under its contract with 
JBC, the Court must strictly enforce the entire contract 
and may not condition its judgment no matter what the equi-
ties may be. However, "equity is not bound by technicali-
ties, but can usually find a way to afford redress for the 
wrongful acts of one clothed with fiduciary power." Dinsmoor 
v. Hill, 187 P. 2d 388, 340 (Kan., 1947). Further, "a breach 
of fiduciary duty is ground for the exercise of equity juris-
diction in the absence of an adequate and complete remedy 
at law." 27 Arn. Jur. 2d, Equity, Section 20, at 544. If 
Taylor National were to have its way in the instant case, 
JBC would be faced with the potential loss of two commis-
sions as a result of Taylor National's own failure to ful-
fill its fiduciary responsibilities. However, the Court Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library S rvices 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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may use its equitable powers to render a judgment which pre-
serves the equities among the parties in a way which a purely 
legal remedy would not. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that even in an action 
which is essentially legal in nature, such as Taylor National's 
claim for a commission in the instant case, equitable prin-
ciples may be applied by the Court: 
The rules of equity arose as a means of avoid-
ing or ameliorating the rigidities and harshness 
of some of the rules and remedies of law. It is 
also to be observed that the differences between 
law and equity are not so distinct as they were 
in former times. The lines between them have be-
come blurred and they have become for the most 
part blended together in what we ref er to gener-
ally as equity and justice. 
* * * 
Consistent with the foregoing, equitable 
claims or defenses may be asserted and tried 
along with or against legal claims or defenses 
in the same action; and equitable principles may 
be applied in an action at law. We can see no 
reason why the doctrine we have just spoken of 
as being rooted in equity and good conscience 
should have any affinity for, or limitation in 
application to, any particular type of conduct 
or controversy. The principles of equity and 
justice are universal; they apply wherever appro-
priate and necessary to enforce rights or to pre-
vent oppression and injustice. (Emphasis added.) 
Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P. 2d 1145, 1148 (Utah, 1976). 
See Marlowe Investment Corporation v. Radmall, 485 P. 2d 
1402 (Utah, 1971). 
The instant case involves not only the plaintiff's claim 
at law for its commission, but also JBC's equitable defense 
of estoppel based on Taylor National's breach of fiduciary 
duty. See R. 13, Ninth Defense. Under the circumstances, 
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the Court has the power in equity, and the duty, to shape a judg-
ment which takes into consideration equitable principles in arriv-
ing at a just result. This the lower court has done in this case. 
POINT II 
A STAY OF EXECUTION ON TAYLOR NATIONAL'S 
JUDGMENT AGAINST JBC IS AN APPROPRIATE 
REMEDY WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF UTAH LAW. 
Because JBC acted in good faith in allowing the commis-
sion to be disbursed to Harward and because Taylor National 
failed in its fiduciary duty to JBC and to itself to protect 
its commission, the trial court determined that it would work 
an injustice were the Court's judgment to result in JBC hav-
ing to pay two commissions instead of the one for which it 
contracted. R. 289, 290, Findings of Fact Nos. 11, 12 and 16. 
This might well be the result if JBC is forced to satisfy Tay-
lor National's judgment and is then unable to collect on its 
judgment over against Harward and Continental Value Realty. 
For this reason the Court has used its equitable powers to 
allocate to Taylor National, because of its breach of duty, 
the risk that JBC's judgment against Harward and Continental 
Value may be uncollectible. Under the circumstances, the 
Court has protected Taylor National by allowing it to execute 
against Harward and Continental Value Realty pursuant to 
JBC's third party judgment against those parties. 
A. Utah Law Permits Execution of a Judgment to be Stayed on 
Equitable Grounds. 
Taylor National protests this portion of the judgment 
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on the basis that there is no Utah law which supports such an 
arrangement. Rule 62 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides in Subsection (a) that: 
(a) Stay upon entry of judgment. Execution 
or other proceedings to enforce a judgment may 
issue immediately upon the entry of the judgment, 
unless the court in its discretion and on such 
conditions for the security of the adverse party 
as are proper, otherwise directs. 
In Palmquist v. Palmquist, 312 P.2nd 779 (Utah, 1957), the 
Utah Supreme Court recognized that this Rule would allow a 
stay of execution on equitable grounds, where •some injustice 
would result were execution not stayed". Id. at 780. The 
Palmquist holding was cited with favor by this Court in a 
recent unpublished opinion in the case of Blackburn v. Black-
burn, Case No. 16651, filed July 17, 1980. The lower court 
exercised its discretion in this case to prevent injustice 
by staying execution on Taylor National's judgment against 
JBC and providing security to Taylor National by allowing 
it to execute on JBC's third party judgment. 
B. The Stay of Execution is Proper on Equitable Grounds 
As a Conditional Judgment. 
Further, in the instant case, the court has in practical 
effect conditioned Taylor National's right to execute on its 
judgment against JBC on a successful execution against the 
third party defendants under JBC's judgment over against 
them. There is substantial precedent for such a conditional 
judgment: 
The judgment itself may contain a stay of 
execution which may be conditional. The Court 
-10-
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in an equity suit has power to make provisions 
for the time when a judgment is to be carried 
into effect. 
33 C.J.S., Executions, Section 39, at 312. Further, the 
power of a court to enter a conditional judgment is well 
established: 
When a court of equity renders a conditional 
decree, it does not make it a contract between 
the parties. It is simply adjusting the equities 
between the parties and granting to one or the 
other certain relief to which litigants may be 
entitled, provided one or the other complies with 
certain directions given by the court in order to 
properly administer equity and effect justice. 
Equity decrees in this respect are numerous. 
(Citations omitted.) 
Mason v. Ellison, 160 P.2d 326, (Ariz., 1945). See Seeger v. 
Odell, 115 P.2d 977 (Cal., 1941); Strain v. Security Title 
Insurance Co., 268 P.2d 167, 170 (Cal. App., 1954). ("In 
imposing a condition, a court of equity is not bound down 
to the strict legal rights of the parties, but will take 
into consideration all the circumstances in order to arrive 
at the justice of the case.") 
Moreover, the stay of execution on Taylor National's judg-
ment combined with the provision that Taylor National may exe-
cute on JBC's judgment over against third party defendants is 
in conformance with a further important principle of equity: 
As a general principle where the prejudicial 
situation has resulted from the wrongful act of 
the third person, the decision must be against 
the party whose conduct made possible the wrong-
doer's act, breach of trust, fraud, or negligence. 
C. The Stay of Execution is Proper Under the Principales 
That the Party Whose Conduct Caused a Loss Should Bear 
The Burden of That Loss. 
-11-
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27 Am. Jur. 2d, Equity, Section 147, at 683. 
This principal was applied by the Utah Supreme Court 
in G. Eugene England Foundation v. Smith's Food King No. 6, 
542 P.2d 753 (Utah 1975), a case very similar to the instant. 
The defendant Smith's Food King leased store space in a build-
ing owned by the plaintiff Foundation, who subsequently traded 
the property to First Federal Corporation for stock. Smith's 
was instructed by the Foundation to thereafter pay its rents 
to the new title holder, First Federal, which it did. A 
year later the Foundation sought rescission of the convey-
ance to First Federal under federal securities law, and some 
months after filing suit notified Smith's of the litigation 
and demanded that defendant pay all future rentals to the 
Foundation. Smith's continued to pay rent to First Federal, 
and the Foundation filed the instant suit against Smith's 
claiming all rents paid by the defendant to First Federal 
after the demand was made. 
In the meantime, the Federal District Court found in 
favor of the Foundation in the original action against First 
Federal, ordering that the conveyance be rescinded as of 
the date it occurred and giving the Foundation judgment for 
all rents received from Smith's by First Federal from the 
date of the conveyance. The Foundation was unable to collect 
its judgment against First Federal, and pursued its state 
court action against Smith's which resulted in summary judg-
ment in Smith's favor. 
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On appeal the Foundation argued that Smith's should 
not have continued to pay rent to First Federal after the 
Foundation's demand, and should be required to reimburse 
the Foundation, whose ownership rights had now been retro-
actively re-established, for money paid to First Federal which 
the plaintiff had been unable to collect. The Supreme Court 
disagreed: 
It may be unfortunate that the Foundation 
cannot collect its judgment for the rentals 
against First Federal Corporation. But the 
fact that the latter cannot pay the judgment 
should not be held against nor adversely affect 
Smith's, who have paid their full rentals 
and now are sought to be charged the second 
time. There is another doctrine involved in 
the administration of justice which bears upon 
the situation here and harmonizes with the 
decision of the trial court: where one of 
two innocent parties must suffer a loss 
because of misconduct of the third (First 
Federal Corporation), the law generally leans 
toward placing the loss upon the one who made 
the choice and created the circumstances out 
of which the loss came about. It was [the 
Foundation] who chose to get involved with 
First Federal Corporation and the trouble 
that emanated therefrom. 
Fed. at 755. 
Under the circumstances of the instant case, JBC had a 
right to depend on Taylor National's fulfillment of its fidu-
ciary duty to represent JBC and protect its interests in 
this transaction. Taylor National's chose not to do so, 
resulting in the third party defendant Leon Harward wrong-
fully appropriating the commission which was due Taylor 
National. Like Smith's Food King in the England Founda-
tion case, JBC, an innocent party, should not be faced with 
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suffering the potential burden of paying its obligations 
twice; and the Court's stay of execution effectively puts 
the burden of any failure to recover the commission paid to 
Harward on Taylor National, the party whose failure to act 
resulted in the commission being paid to the wrong party 
initially. 
Thus the Court's judgment results in justice being done 
among the parties and is based on recognized equitable prin-
ciples. Taylor National has produced no authority which 
impugns the Court's power to fashion such a remedy. 
POINT III 
A JUDGMENT WHOSE EXECUTION IS PERMANENTLY 
ENJOINED DOES NOT BECOME A LIEN ON REAL 
PROPERTY OF THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR. 
Taylor National urges that under the provisions of 
u.c.A., Section 78-22-1, once the judgment in the instant 
case is docketed it becomes a lien against JBC's real prop-
erty by action of law, and that this result is not subject 
to abrogation by the Court. As to the great majority of 
judgments, which are due and payable when such judgments 
are docketed, this contention is undoubtedly true. However, 
in the instant case, because of the prohibition against execu-
tion imposed by the Court as part of the judgment, the "judg-
ment debtor" does not become liable to the plaintiff on docket-
ing of this particular judgment, and the lien, therefore, would 
be inappropriate. Furthermore, it would harm JBC's interest 
contrary to the court's intent of assisting Taylor National 
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to recover its commissiuon while at the same time protecting 
JBC from having to pay the same real estate commission twice. 
A similar result was reached in an analogous situation 
in Moniz v. Moniz, 299 P.2d 329 (Cal. App., 1956), where in 
a previous divorce action the wife had received a judgment 
in her favor representing her share of the marital property 
to be paid to her in installments. Her former husband, the 
judgment debtor, complained that the abstract of judgment 
filed with the clerk represented in part amounts not yet 
due under the judgment, and, therefore, unjustifiably encum-
bered his real property to that extent. The Court noted that: 
A judgment which provides for payment in 
installments does not when recorded create a lien, 
at least as to amounts not due, unless such lien 
is impressed by the terms of the judgment itself, 
because there would be no clear way for the debtor 
to relieve his property of the lien without paying 
the entire amount. Yager v. Yager, 60 P.2d 422; 
Bird v. Murphy, 256 P 258. (Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 332. See Boyle v. Baggs, 350 P.2d 622 (Utah 1960). 
Likewise, in the instant case, a lien to secure payment 
of an obligation cannot be created on the defendant's prop-
erty by the filing of a judgment representing a debt to Tay-
lor National which it is not obliged to pay. As in Moniz, 
supra, even though no obligation to pay the judgment was yet 
in existence, in order to clear the lien the entire sum 
would have to be paid. The unconditional judgment suggested 
by Taylor National would be a substantial burden on JBC's 
business of building and selling homes and would effectively 
nullify the court's prohibition against execution, 
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i.e., in order to carry on its business operation JBC would 
have to pay the judgment amount to Taylor National contrary 
to the intent and ruling of the court. 
The trial court's equitable limitations on the judgment 
are further supported by the rule cited in 46 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Judgments §242 that: 
Not every judgment operates as a lien, 
and this is true even though the judgment 
directs the payment of money •••• [T]o 
operate as a lien, a judgment must be one 
which is final and conclusive of the matters 
in controversy between the parties, and 
which carries with it the right to issue 
execution enforceable against the property 
alleged to be subject to the lien of the 
judgment. (Footnote ommitted.) 
In addition, 49 C.J.S., Judgment §504 notes that "[a] 
perpetual injunction against the collection of a judgment 
will destroy its lien." In the instant case, the court in 
effect did permanently enjoin collection of the judgment 
against JBC. Of course, the judgment was given in the first 
place only in an effort to provide a remedy to Taylor National 
as against Harward even though Taylor National had failed to 
join Harward in the suit. Taylor National now asks this 
Court to grant it precisely what the trial court refused to 
do, i.e., make JBC pay a second commission when Taylor 
National had by its negligence and wilful refusal to deal 
with Harward caused the first commission to be diverted. 
The trial court's ability to prevent the judgment against 
JBC from having the effect of a lien finds further foundation where 
equitable estoppel has been pleaded (R. 13) and factually 
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determined by the court to exist (R. 289, Finding of Fact 
No. 12). As the Kansas Supreme Court stated in City of 
Chetopa v. Board of County Commissioners of Labette County, 
133 P.2d 174, 177 (Kan. 1943) (citing 19 Am. Jr. §41, p. 
6400): 
Generally speaking ••• equitable estoppel is 
a rule of justice which in its proper field 
prevails over all other rules. It is a rule 
of last resort, but when it is aroused into 
activity, it stays the operation of other 
rules which have not run their course, when 
to allow them to proceed further would be 
a greater wrong than to enjoin them perman-
ently. It may, in proper cases, operate to 
cut off a right or privilege conferred by 
statute or even by the Constitution. (Emphasis 
Added.) 
The trial court's ruling prohibiting judgment against 
JBC from taking effect as a lien was thus a fair and proper 
resolution of the controversy before it and the court acted 
within its discretion under the equities of the case. Noth-
ing in UCA, Section 78-22-1 requires a contrary conclusion 
and the court's judgment should be upheld. 
POINT IV 
IF THAT PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
TRIAL COURT STAYING EXECUTION AGAINST JBC 
AND PREVENTING THE JUDGMENT FROM BECOMING 
A LIEN ON JBC'S PROPERTY CANNOT BE UPHELD, 
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST JBC SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
If this Court determines that the lower court did not 
have the power to permanently stay execution on Taylor Na-
tional' s judgment against JBC as to prevent said judgment from 
becoming a lien on JBC's property, then the lower court's Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Libra y Services 
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entire judgment against JBC and in favor of Taylor National 
should be reversed on the grounds that an unconditional judg-
ment against JBC would be fatally inconsistent with the lower 
court's Findings of Fact. See Parrott Bros. Co. v. Ogden 
City, 167 P. 807, (Utah 1917). 
The lower court made the following Findings of Fact 
which are controlling on this issue: 
9. Plaintiff as listing realtor to JBC and 
its fiduciary failed to take reasonable and neces-
sary measures to protect its real estate commission 
as against third party defendant Leon Harward and 
Continental Value Realty. 
* * * 
11. Defendant JBC paid the six percent real 
estate commission in good faith at time of closing, 
believing it had fulfilled its obligations in ac-
cordance with the Earnest Money Agreement. 
12. Plaintiff, in failing to exercise its 
responsibilities as fiduciary to defendant JBC in 
equity and in good conscience, has waived and is 
otherwise estopped from recovery of its second 
real estate commission against defendant JBC or 
from recovery of an attorney's fee against JBC 
incident to collection of any sales commission 
owing to plaintiff, except as may be recovered 
through JBC from third party defendants Harward, 
Harrison and Soule. 
R. 289-90, Findings of Fact Nos. 9, 11 and 12. See Pryor 
v. Pryor, 168 P.2d 875, 877, (Okl. 1946) ("[W]here the separ-
ate or special findings as to the facts are contrary to final 
conclusion of judgment, • • • the findings of fact must control. 
• • • n ) • 
Thus, the lower court's Findings of Fact, which have 
not been controverted on this appeal, establish that, as 
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between plaintiff and third party defendants, plaintiff was 
more entitled to receive a commission. However, as between 
plaintiff and defendant, the defendant was not liable for 
a commission to plaintiff on grounds of waiver and estoppel 
due to the plaintiff's breach of its duties to JBC under 
the listing contract. 
The relevant Conclusions of Law (R. 295, Conclusion of 
Law No. 4) and Paragraph 1 of the Court's Amended Judgment 
(R. 299} show that in conformance with its Findings of Fact, 
the Court, based on considerations of equity, absolutely 
precluded the plaintiff's ability to execute on its judgment. 
For this Court to create a judgment against JBC absolute in 
nature, as the plaintiff has requested in this appeal, would 
result in a judgment that would be the clear antithesis in 
every respect to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions, and 
present judgment of the trial court. 
In addition, such a result would be contrary to the 
prior decision of this court in England Foundation, supra, 
discussed at Point II, a case substantially on point with 
the instant case. If this Court should determine the present 
judgment is inappropriate as framed, then it should reverse 
the judgment against JBC on the basis of the lower court's 
Findings of Fact or in the alternative vacate the judgment 
and return it to the lower court for further proceedings in 
accordance with its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
see Parrott Bros. Co., supra; Bailey v. Murdock, 421 P.2d 
639, 644 (Okl. 1966). 
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It may be argued that if such a decision is made, then 
Taylor National will have no recovery against anyone, includ-
ing Harward and Continental Value Realty. If this is so, the 
plaintiff has only itself to blame. The plaintiff could have, 
had it chosen to, joined third-party defendants as co-defen-
dants with JBC on any of several theories, including conver-
sion of property. However, for reasons of its own it chose 
not to, and JBC should not have to suffer for that decision 
and thus be required to pay a double commission because of 
Taylor National's earlier breaches under the listing agreement. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT HAS DISCRETION TO DENY 
ATTORNEYS' FEES TO TAYLOR NATIONAL BECAUSE 
TAYLOR NATIONAL BREACHED ITS FIDUCIARY 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONTRACT. 
The plaintiff contends that the Court's recognition of 
the validity of the listing agreement between Taylor National 
and JBC to the extent of awarding Taylor National judgment on 
its claim for commission in this matter compels the Court to 
award the plaintiff attorneys' fees under the attorneys' fee 
provision of that contract. The Court notes in its decision, 
however, that its determination not to award attorneys' fees 
to the plaintiff is based on the fact that the plaintiffs' 
breach of fiduciary duty in this situation was the proximate 
cause of its incurring attorneys' fees in this action. As 
discussed in Point I, supra, in an action such as the instant 
case involving equitable defenses and considerations, the 
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Court has great latitude in shaping its remedy, and under 
the circumstances its decision not to award attorneys' fees 
is just and equitable. 
Further, in Utah attorneys' fees must be awarded only 
to a party who fully prevails in an action. For example, 
in Fireman's Insurance Company v. Brown, 529 P.2d 412 (Utah, 
1974), the vendor under a real estate contract attempted to 
foreclose on a purchaser who had failed to make the required 
monthly payments for over a year, but who at the end of such 
time had made a proper tender of the amount due which was 
improperly refused. The Court found in favor of the defen-
dant. Although the contract between the parties provided 
for the award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party, 
the Court refused to award them to the defendant because 
both parties had been at fault: 
Since the buyer had been in default for 
twenty months, and the seller refused to convey 
on proper tender, there was good reason to make 
no award of attorney's fees to either side. 
Id. at 420. 
Likewise, in Amoss v. Bennion, 420 P.2d 47 (Utah, 1966), 
the Court entered a judgment of specific performance on a 
real estate contract for the plaintiff purchaser. The Su-
preme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, but held 
that the purchase price should be adjusted in favor of the 
defendant. The Court concluded that because both sides 
prevailed on some of their contentions, attorney's fees 
should be awarded to neither. See Fullmer v. Blood, 546 
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P.2d 606 (Utah, 1976). 
In the instant case, although Taylor National prevailed 
in its contention that it was owed a commission under the 
listing agreement with JBC, the defendant JBC prevailed 
in its contention that Taylor National had breached its fidu-
ciary duty to JBC under the same agreement and was thus es-
topped from collecting a second commission from JBC. See 
R. 13, Ninth Defense; R. 259, Finding of Fact No. 12. Under 
such circumstances, the Court was well within its discretion 
in refusing to award attorneys' fees to the plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
In the instant case the Court was faced with the complex 
task of adjusting the legal rights and equities among several 
parties. The Amended Judgment adequately implements the 
Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this matter 
and is in conformance with applicable law. The judgment 
should, therefore, be upheld by the Court. If the Court 
feels that the judgment cannot be upheld with its equitable 
limitations, then based on the lower court's Findings of 
Fact, the judgment against JBC should be reversed in order 
to effectively implement the court's decision or, in the 
alternative, the judgment should be vacated and returned to 
the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with 
its own findings. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By ____ _,______.,. ________ _ 
Stephen oth 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Third Party Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFI~E 
I hereby certify that on the~ day of October, 1980, 
I personally mailed two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent to Jackson Howard of Howard, Lewis & Petersen, 
120 East 300 North, Provo, Utah 
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